In Re: Lloyd Securities, Inc. by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-6-1996 
In Re: Lloyd Securities, Inc. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Lloyd Securities, Inc." (1996). 1996 Decisions. 227. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/227 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
           
 
No. 95-1543 
           
 
IN RE: LLOYD SECURITIES, INC., 
                 Debtor 
 
ARTHUR ALPERSTEIN, GLORIA BENTZ, GLORIANNE BENTZ, 
HERMAN BERKOWITZ, LORRAINE BERKOWITZ, JAMES DEAMER, 
EMPIRICAL ENTERPRISES, INC., KENNETH FELZER, RUTH HOFFMAN, 
LLOYD HUMPHREY, RICHARD KATZ, LINDA KATZ, HARRIET KIRSCH, 
JOHN KOCHERSPERGER, ALICE McCABE, JOSEPH McGUCKIN, 
PHYLLIS NEWCOMER, TIMOTHY NYLAND, JAMES NYLAND, 
VERNETTA NYLAND, LARRY ROTHSTEIN, FAYE ROTHSTEIN, 
DWAYNE SIMPSON, KATHRYN SIMPSON, ALAN SMITH,  
ESTATE OF RUSSELL SNYDER, MICHAEL SOROKER,  
BARBARA SOROKER, and BAZELON & LESS, * 
                           Appellants    
 
* (Amended as per the Clerk's 7/18/95 Order) 
           
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 94-01391 and 94-01416) 
           
 
Argued September 13, 1995 
 
Before:  MANSMANN, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed February 6, 1996) 
 
 
RICHARD L. BAZELON, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
PAUL B. BECH, ESQUIRE 
Bazelon & Less 
1515 Market Street, 7th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
STEPHEN P. HARBECK, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
KEVIN H. BELL, ESQUIRE 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
805 15th Street, N.W., Suite 800 
Washington, DC 20005 
2 
Attorney for Appellee Securities Investor 
 
 
WARREN T. PRATT, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
DAVID A. SEARLES, ESQUIRE 
Drinker, Biddle & Reath 
1345 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia National Bank Building 
Philadelphia, PA 19107-3496 
Attorney for Appellee Shields 
 
 
           
OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 The customers of a failed securities dealer, Lloyd 
Securities, Inc., and their attorneys sought fees from the res 
created by the dealer's liquidation under the Securities Investor 
Protection Act ("SIPA").  The district court denied the motion 
and the customers and attorneys appeal.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 The facts of this case are well-stated in the opinions 
of the district and bankruptcy courts.  See In re Lloyd 
Securities, Inc., 183 B.R. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Lloyd 
Securities, Inc., 163 B.R. 242 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).  We will 
assume the reader is familiar with those opinions and present 
only a summary. 
A. 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission sued Lloyd 
Securities and several related entities.  The SEC alleged that 
Lloyd and its principals engaged in a scheme to defraud investors 
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in violation of the securities laws.  The court granted the 
requested relief and appointed a receiver.  Shortly thereafter, 
customers of Lloyd Securities brought a class action against 
Lloyd Securities, its principals and other parties that had 
participated in the customers' securities transactions.  This 
came to be known as the Deamer case. 
 The Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") 
filed an application in the SEC action for a protective decree, 
turning the receivership into a liquidation.  The liquidation 
proceeding was then referred to the bankruptcy court.  The 
customers assert as a basis for their recovery that they were 
instrumental in causing the SIPC to seek the liquidation of Lloyd 
Securities, although this is disputed. 
 The trustee filed a number of chapter 11 cases on 
behalf of Lloyd's principals and entities related to Lloyd 
Securities.  These cases were all administered jointly and were 
known as the IBEX cases.  The customers then moved to have the 
IBEX cases administered jointly with the SIPA liquidation itself 
in order to save administrative costs.  Although the trustee and 
the SIPC opposed the motion, the bankruptcy court indicated its 
intention to grant it and the cases were ultimately administered 
together. 
 The trustee instructed Lloyd's customers to submit 
their net equity claims by April 1991; yet, by May 1992 payment 
had been made on only five of them, leaving approximately 85 
outstanding.  This led the customers to file a motion to compel 
the trustee to rule on their claims.  The district court never 
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actually decided this motion, but by September 1992, the trustee 
had ruled on most of the claims. 
 The trustee also filed adversary proceedings against 
Newbridge Securities, Inc. and several banks.  In response to 
those defendants' allegations that the trustee lacked standing to 
bring the claims, the customers intervened and participated 
actively in that litigation, which ultimately settled in the 
plaintiffs' favor. 
B. 
 Because of their direct involvement in the above 
litigation, the customers submitted to the bankruptcy court 
applications for compensation under SIPA, specifically 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78eee(b)(5).  The first of these applications sought 
approximately $22,000 for services rendered in connection with 
the motion to administer the IBEX cases and the SIPA liquidation 
jointly.  The other requested almost $260,000 for all other 
services they rendered in actually litigating both proceedings. 
The SIPC opposed both applications. 
 The bankruptcy court held that, while compensation was 
governed generally by SIPA § 78eee(b)(5)(C), Congress intended 
the specific standards of the Bankruptcy Code as a substantive 
overlay to SIPA.  Accordingly, the court ruled that "the 
standards established under the Code for compensation 
applications, if not all of the Code's specific restrictions, 
should be liberally borrowed in interpretation of [§ 
78eee(b)](5)(C) as well."  163 B.R. at 252. 
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 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court rejected SIPC's 
contention that the customers' remedy was limited to 
§503(b)(3)(D) of the Code.  Although that section would appear to 
contemplate a compensation claim on behalf of customer-creditors, 
the court noted that it specifically does not apply to a chapter 
7 proceeding, which is precisely how a SIPA liquidation is 
conducted.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b).  SIPC's argument would thus 
preclude recovery of compensation for customers in all SIPA 
cases, a result the bankruptcy court thought that Congress could 
not have intended without explicit statutory language to that 
effect.  See 163 B.R. at 252-53. 
 Even so, the bankruptcy court concluded that, while 
§503(b)(3)(D)'s exclusion of chapter 7 proceedings could not be 
applied literally, its substantive standards for recovery should 
be applied in a case arising under SIPA.  Id. at 254.  Looking to 
the caselaw interpreting that section, it held that recovery was 
possible only if the applicants' services were not duplicative 
and benefitted the estate itself. 
 The court also imported the standard of 11 U.S.C. 
§506(c) as a criterion for determining the customers' eligibility 
for compensation, even though that section was not literally 
applicable by its terms, either.  Applying the caselaw 
interpreting § 506(c), the court concluded that recovery was 
possible if the applicant proved that its efforts benefitted the 
SIPC (the "objective test"), or if the SIPC consented to the 
performance of the services (the "subjective test").  163 B.R. at 
255. 
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 Applying these standards, the bankruptcy court held 
that the customers would be awarded fees only on that portion of 
their application dealing with the motion to jointly administer 
the IBEX and SIPA proceedings.  It rejected, on both legal and 
factual grounds, the contention that the customers were 
responsible for initiating the SIPA liquidation proceeding.  Id. 
at 255-56.  It also held that the customers' intervention in the 
Newbridge proceeding and their filing of the Deamer action 
duplicated the trustee's efforts and were undertaken solely to 
benefit themselves, not the estate.  Id. at 257.  And because the 
customers' actions were both unsolicited and duplicated other 
efforts, the bankruptcy court concluded that they met neither the 
objective nor subjective standard of § 506(c).  Id. 
 On the other hand, the court believed that the joint 
administration of the IBEX and SIPA proceedings saved the SIPC 
money.  Thus, even though no general creditors of Lloyd 
Securities benefitted, making the customers' efforts ineligible 
for compensation under § 503(b)(3)(D), the bankruptcy court held 
that compensation was proper under the standard of § 506(c).  Id. 
at 258. 
 Finally, the bankruptcy court rejected compensation 
under the "common fund doctrine."  Although it opined that the 
doctrine could provide the basis for compensation in an 
appropriate case, the court concluded that the "fund" in this 
case was created for the customers themselves, not for the estate 
generally or for the SIPC; hence, there was no basis for the 
customers to demand compensation from the SIPC.  Id. at 259. 
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C. 
 The customers appealed to the district court, which 
agreed with the bankruptcy court's application of Code 
§503(b)(3)(D), but disagreed with its analysis under § 506(c), 
and held that § 506(c) did not apply in a SIPA liquidation.  183 
B.R. at 394.  It then concluded that the bankruptcy court's 
reasons for denying compensation under § 503(b)(3)(D) were 
legally and factually correct.  Id. at 395-97.  Accordingly, 
because the circumstances of the case did not warrant 
compensation under §503, and the bankruptcy court's award under § 
506 was erroneous as a matter of law, the district court held 
that the customers could not recover under SIPA § 78eee.   
 As a final matter, the court considered whether the 
customers could recover under the common fund doctrine, but 
concluded that, because the trustee and the SIPA were not the 
passive beneficiaries of the customers' efforts, but litigated 
the case vigorously, they could not be responsible for the 
customers' expenses under the doctrine.  Id. at 397.  The 
customers and their counsel now appeal. 
II. 
 Appellants argue that the sole standard for 
compensation of services in a SIPA proceeding is set forth in 
§78eee(b)(5).  They reject the conclusion of the district and 
bankruptcy courts that this section of SIPA must be interpreted 
in light of analogous provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 
78eee(b)(5)(A) provides that "[a]ny person seeking allowances 
shall file with the court an application which complies in form 
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and content with the provisions of" the Code.  Section 
78eee(b)(5)(C) further states that "the court shall give due 
consideration to the nature, extent, and value of the services 
rendered[.]"  According to appellants, this set of standards is 
complete in itself and rests on its own, without any need to 
engraft portions of the Bankruptcy Code.1 
A. 
 Although appellants' argument does have some 
superficial plausibility, it is difficult to reconcile with the 
language of 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b), which provides, in pertinent 
part: 
To the extent consistent with the provisions 
of this chapter, a liquidation proceeding 
shall be conducted in accordance with, and as 
though it were being conducted under chapters 
1, 3, and 5 and subchapters I & II of chapter 
7 of Title 11. 
 
The district court held that if appellants were entitled to 
receive compensation under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 
they would have to meet the strictures of § 503(b)(3)(D). 
                     
1Appellants rely on In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 
833, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1994), for the proposition that, "once an 
applicant for compensation is deemed generally eligible for 
compensation, the court must determine the amount of compensation 
to be awarded by analyzing the factors set forth in the governing 
statute, and may not engraft additional criteria."  Busy Beaver 
involved a district court that engrafted additional requirements 
onto § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code itself.  We held only that 
§330 must be applied in accordance with its literal terms and 
never decided the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Code forms a 
substantive overlay to SIPA.  Accord United States Trustee v. 
Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Appellants do not contend otherwise.2  Section 503 is part of 
chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code and thus appears to be 
incorporated into SIPA by the plain language of § 78fff(b).  
 Unfortunately for appellants, § 503(b)(3)(D), by its 
terms, applies only to chapter 9 and 11 bankruptcy cases, while 
§78fff(b) expressly provides that a SIPA liquidation is to be 
treated as a chapter 7 bankruptcy.  Taken literally, then, if 
§503 of the Bankruptcy Code is incorporated into SIPA, there can 
be no recovery for customer expenses in this (or any other) SIPA 
liquidation.  See Lebron v. Mechem Financial, Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 
945 (3d Cir. 1994) (§ 503(b)(3)(D) does not permit creditors 
recovery of expenses after chapter 11 case is converted to 
chapter 7).  
 The bankruptcy court recognized this problem, but chose 
to incorporate the principles of § 503 into SIPA anyway.  See 163 
B.R. at 252-53.  The district court agreed, adding that 
incorporation of the Bankruptcy Code is only required to the 
extent the Code is consistent with SIPA and opining that Congress 
could not have intended that customers of a failed securities 
dealer could never recover their expenses.  183 B.R. at 394. 
B. 
 Appellants argue that § 503 was not incorporated into 
SIPA, relying on our opinion in SEC v. Aberdeen Securities Co., 
526 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1975), which they believe stands for the 
                     
2The bankruptcy court awarded compensation under § 506(c), but 
the district court held that § 506(c) was inapplicable in a SIPA 
case.  Appellants do not challenge that ruling on appeal. 
10 
proposition that only the procedural aspects of the Bankruptcy 
Code were incorporated into SIPA.  There, interpreting earlier 
versions of SIPA and the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, we opined: 
 Thus § 6(c) [of SIPA] is intended to 
make the flexible Chapter X procedures 
available for SIPA liquidations.  This does 
not mean that every provision of Chapter X, 
including provisions not related to 
procedures for the operation of a bankrupt, 
has been incorporated into the SIPA.  Only 
those provisions relating to the procedures 
for conducting the affairs of the estate 
during bankruptcy administration, except as 
inconsistent with the provision of SIPA, have 
been incorporated. 
 
Id. at 606.  In Aberdeen, the issue was whether the provisions of 
§ 243 of chapter X of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act (which authorized 
compensation for services incurred by creditors and stockholders) 
was incorporated into SIPA.  It is notable in that context that 
the SIPA statute then in existence incorporated a chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Act that explicitly permitted reorganization rather 
than liquidation, even though SIPA itself required liquidation.3 
 Faced with this apparent inconsistency between the 
statutory purposes of SIPA and chapter X, we looked to the 
legislative history of SIPA and found considerable evidence that 
Congress intended only to "make the flexible Chapter X procedures 
available for SIPA liquidations."  526 F.2d at 606.  Because §243 
of the Bankruptcy Act did not "relate to the conduct of the 
                     
3Indeed, the statutory text of § 6(c) provided for the 
incorporation of chapter X "[e]xcept as inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter and except that in no event shall a 
plan of reorganization be formulated." 
11 
administration or liquidation procedures to be followed," id. we 
held that it was not incorporated into SIPA. 
 The statutory scheme today is different.  In 1978, 
§6(c) of SIPA was repealed and replaced by § 78fff(b), which 
requires that SIPA liquidations be conducted as chapter 7 
bankruptcies under the Bankruptcy Code.  Chapter 7, in contrast 
to the repealed chapter X, provides only for liquidation.  There 
is therefore no inconsistency between the two statutes that would 
cause us to look to the legislative history to help us interpret 
the plain language of § 78fff(b). 
 The statutory framework that led the Aberdeen court to 
its holding no longer exists.  In light of the supervening 
statutory changes to both SIPA and the bankruptcy laws, we are 
not bound by Aberdeen.  Rather, we adopt the reasoning of the 
Eleventh Circuit.  In In re Government Securities Corp., 972 F.2d 
328, 330 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952, 113 S. 
Ct. 1366 (1993), the court of appeals rejected the precise 
argument appellants make here.  It opined: 
[Appellant] claims that § 78fff(b) of SIPA 
incorporates only the procedural and not the 
substantive aspects of the Bankruptcy Code 
insofar as they are consistent with SIPA. 
This argument is entirely meritless.  The 
plain language of § 78fff(b) makes no such 
distinction, and explicitly incorporates . . 
. the Bankruptcy Code. 
972 F.2d at 330 n.14 
                     
4In addition, subchapter III of chapter 7 (which was not 
incorporated by § 78fff(b), governs stockbroker liquidations in 
cases where the SIPC does not initiate a liquidation proceeding 
under SIPA.  Such stockbrokers also have customers, yet (because 
it is a chapter 7 proceeding) customer claims for attorney's fees 
cannot be recovered.  Subchapter III was enacted within months 
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 We therefore conclude that SIPA incorporates § 503 of 
the Bankruptcy Code and requires that a SIPA proceeding be 
treated like a chapter 7 bankruptcy case.  Because the customer 
expenses at issue are not recoverable in a chapter 7 proceeding, 
they are not recoverable here.5 
III. 
 Appellants also argue that they are entitled to 
compensation under the common fund doctrine.  They assert that 
their efforts resulted in additional recovery to the SIPC, a 
benefit it is not entitled to simply receive without paying just 
compensation.  Both the bankruptcy and district courts concluded 
that this theory of recovery is available in a SIPA case, but 
found as a factual matter that appellants were not entitled to 
compensation.  See  183 B.R. at 397; 163 B.R. at 258-59.  The 
district court treated appellants' argument as follows: 
The customers assert that SIPC was the 
primary beneficiary of the customers' labors, 
and that it should be made to compensate them 
accordingly.  It cannot be said, however, 
that SIPC and the Trustee have been unjustly 
enriched as a result of the customers' 
efforts.  Indeed, as the Bankruptcy Court 
concluded, the Trustee was an active 
participant, and not some passive 
beneficiary, who "retained very competent 
control" over the matters at hand.  Lloyd, 
163 B.R. at 256.  Accordingly, we conclude 
                                                                  
after SIPA was amended.  It is therefore not anomalous (as 
appellants suggest) that no fees can be recovered by customers in 
a SIPA proceeding.  In fact, as appellees point out, it would be 
strange if Congress did intend for one class of claims to be 
compensable while the other was not. 
5Because of our conclusion, we need not consider whether, as a 
factual matter, appellants' efforts met the standard for 
compensation under § 503. 
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that SIPC and the Trustee are not proper 
targets of a bid to recover under the common 
fund doctrine. 
Lloyd, 183 B.R. at 397. 
 On appeal, appellants argue that "[t]he claims which 
created the lion's share of the fund would have been lost had the 
customers, through their counsel, not performed the services." 
The courts below, however, found as a matter of fact that this 
was not true because the trustee either had tolling agreements or 
had filed the appropriate lawsuits, and because the customers' 
efforts duplicated the trustee's.  We conclude that these 
findings are not clearly erroneous. 
 Additionally, the bankruptcy court noted that the 
"fund" recovered by the customers' efforts was customer property, 
not property recovered for the debtor's estate or the SIPC.  163 
B.R. at 259.  And although this property may well have offset 
some of the money that the SIPC was required to advance to those 
customers, the SIPC was well-represented by counsel and was 
entitled to make its own litigation decisions without being 
surcharged later by customers who chose to second-guess those 
decisions.   
 Furthermore, in spite of the litigation pursued by the 
customers, the Lloyd Securities general estate still contains no 
assets.  The customers' efforts simply conferred no benefit upon 
the general creditors of Lloyd Securities; accordingly, they have 
no legitimate grounds to recover fees from the estate.  Finally, 
appellants themselves disclaim their entitlement to any portion 
of the customer property fund that has been allocated to Lloyd 
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customers, presumably seeking to recover from the general estate. 
Because that estate is, as already stated, empty, appellants 
would be unable to collect their expenses in any event.  We 
therefore agree with the district and bankruptcy courts that 
appellants have no claim under the common fund doctrine.6 
IV. 
 We will therefore affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
                     
6Because we decide the issue on factual grounds, we need not and 
do not decide whether the common fund doctrine is legally 
applicable in a SIPA liquidation. 
